


# OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

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24 February 1981

ADM. B. R. INMAN, USN

DDCI

FROM:

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SUBJECT:

CIA Utilization of University Resources

### Introduction

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Confirmation testimony by the new DCI and DDCI, as well as related press reports, has frequently mentioned the need to draw on the nation's university resources as a means of improving the Agency and its products. Certainly this is far from a novel idea, and efforts along these lines have been tried on multiple occasions, with varying degrees of success. This memorandum outlines some of my ideas on the general subject, based on my own experience as a member of the Academic Community in the Vietnam era, and as one closely associated with the Intelligence Community in the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate era.

## The University - CIA Relationship

As a matter of general principle, it would seem that the university system is a logical place for the Agency to turn as a resource base. The faculty, advanced student body, and other university assets contain a considerable "substantive" base, as well as analytical skills in a variety of areas in which the Agency has major concerns. In many cases, the linguistic skills and regional expertise, for example, may potentially be of great help.

At the same time, major problems exist in the University-CIA relationship which have presented problems in the past, and are likely to do so in the future. At the risk of overstating the obvious, the following should be considered:

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- The turmoil over the Watergate era, Vietnam, and pub-O lic hearings on past CIA abuses has abated on some of campuses, but not others. Even the hint of a CIA connection for a faculty member at Cornell, for exlic hearings on past CIA abuses has abated on some ample, could be highly adverse; while a similar association at UCLA or Carnegie-Mellon would be of little sensitive to these types of problems and the rela-wear tionships it develops.
- 0 University faculty are seldom trained in the intelligence "business." While their substantive expertise is frequently relevant, it is important to recognize that few are experienced in what may be viewed as current intelligence functions, types of materials available to the Agency. The implications of this fact are considered in greater detail below.
- University faculty are oriented toward the investigather than that of the government sponsor. The system of recognition, promotion, etc., is based on and ly achievement so O of recognition, promotion, etc., is based on scholar- of research requirements. This is at the root of problems the source. lems the government has generally had with work sponsored at universities.

As a practical matter, the Agency can utilize the university system in several ways, including:

- R&D contracts with a specific institution for a spe-O cific task or set of tasks, much as it has and does with other contractors;
- Consulting and similar contract relationships with we specific faculty or students. O specific faculty or students;
- Recruitment of university personnel and students into him the Agency as government employees. and 0
- 0 Other programs (such as the CIA "Academic Outreach" program) which conduct seminars, etc., to solicit the views and support of university personnel.

Each of these has advantages and drawbacks associated with it, but must be compared to the general problems suggested

above. The fundamental question for the Agency, in each case, is whether it can obtain a specific needed service or performance of a well-defined task. All too frequently the Agency, and other governmental sponsors as well, have sought to fund what appeared to be "good people" or good ideas, only to find performance failed to meet original expectations. In many cases, the Agency will be compelled to make some considerable investment in teaching what are otherwise good people about its operation, the intelligence business, and its particular requirements before it can expect useful outputs.

#### A Base of Substantive Expertise

We are all well aware of the problems the Agency has had in various cases where changed or crisis requirements point up a shortage in depth of substantive expertise. Clearly, the range of Third World situations over the past few years presents sufficient examples. Analysts with little or no "country" experience are pressed into service, most often with no language capability or cultural background. One obvious answer has been to call on university personnel with a wide range and depth of experience.

Unfortunately, where Agency personnel are strong, university specialists are frequently weak. In many cases, substantive experts are not engaged in current intelligence, and may have focused their attention on historical problems or issues not directly related to Agency concerns.

If such expertise is to be effectively utilized, it must be in concert with Agency analysis, not in opposition to it. One simple approach may be to select a few university experts in a given area; get them cleared; run them through a short course in the intelligence process; and have them read and react to Agency products (e.g., IR's, NIE's, Weekly Review or NID pieces, etc.). Let them go over drafts of such products and provide critiques of strengths, weaknesses, etc. Professors are accustomed to reading other people's work and "grading" it. After they have done this for a while, let them try their own hand at contributing to Agency or Community products.

One problem the Agency traditionally has had is that many of its products are inherently "consensus" products, and therefore must reflect a Community view. As consensus products, such documents frequently fail to reflect divergent views or particular insights of the analysts involved. Alternatively, the university environment is one which fosters individual views and gives light to divergent opinions. Outside expertise drawn from universities may thus be a useful check on consensus views of the Community.

## Development of Analytical Methodologies

For several decades, the government has funded universities for "basic research and development" of new tools, techniques and methods that may ultimately be of benefit in the national security area. Certainly NSF, DARPA, Navy/ONR, Air Force/OSR, and Army/ARI, to name only a few, have been engaged in this. At best, this is undertaken with the understanding that the results will not be of likely use in the near-term, and may not be of use for decades, if at all.

Whether or not the Agency continues to engage in this type of enterprise remains open to question. The results of prior efforts conducted by NFAC(OPA) and DDS&T(ORD/AMR) are, I believe, mixed at best. If it does, however, it must do so with the explicit understanding that it will take the commitment of major resources over a prolonged period, with little expectation of tangible results in the near- to mid-term.

At best, the Agency is now adopting methods and techniques of analysis which were developed in the university system over a decade ago. Following this model, it is reasonable to assume that methods developed over the next several years may not see widespread use in the Community until the end of the century.

The Agency's best hope in this regard is to continue to staff its own production offices, where possible, with university graduates skilled in these tools, and expect that their prior training will be adapted to the Agency requirements. At the 7 present time, there is a great deal of systemic bias against such initiative on the part of young analysts. Until such problems are solved internally, any real hope of "technology transfer" will remain limited at best.

### Courses of Action

On balance, the conclusion is that university resources offer some potential for the Agency, if properly solicited, managed, utilized, and coordinated with internal actions. At best, they offer some depth of substantive expertise and a source of some analytic skills not currently available within the Agency. Again, the Agency must be cognizant of the limitations extant in the university system, and what they mean for the Community.

Unremarkably, it is suggested that the Agency continue to follow roughly the same courses of action with respect to university resourses as it has in the past, with some changes in focus and a reconsideration of the expectations which it holds for each type of approach.

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- (1) R&D Contracts: Where practical, university teams should be encouraged to propose and bid on contract research funded by the Agency. Unsolicited proposals in specific substantive areas should be given intensive consideration, and efforts made to solicit university bids to Agency requirements (RFP's). The two major caveats here are that the university be held responsible for providing the staff proposed, rather than student "substitutes;" and that particular efforts be made to ensure inputs are responsive to Agency interests, rather than the perceived interests of university investigators.
- (2) Consultants: The Agency has been successful in the past in identifying substantive experts within the university system, and should intensify its efforts here. Particular attention should be given to enlisting a cadre of substantive experts in Third World areas of likely importance to the Community. Security processing of such individuals should be completed so that access can be granted as needed, and programs undertaken to educate Agency consultants about the Community, its requirements, data collection techniques, the estimative process, and related matters. It might be useful to form small panels of such substantive experts to meet several times a year under Agency auspices for dialogues with Agency analysts, briefings, and informal exchanges of views.
- (3) Sabbatical Programs: The Agency should initiate or expand programs whereby substantive experts could spend a sabbatical year with the Agency, working with analysts in production offices. This would provide an opportunity for the university professional to learn about the Agency in depth, of later use as an ongoing consultant; and for the infusion of substantive expertise into the production office. In many ways this follows the Community practice of rotational assignments, which has been of widely demonstrated success.
- (4) Personnel Recruitment: Since its inception, the Agency has sought to recruit its professional staff from among the best of the nation's university graduates. Continued efforts should be made to recruit talented graduates, advanced-degree candidates, and young faculty making mid-career transitions. Particular emphasis should be given to candidates with linguistic skills and expertise in Third World areas of potential importance to the Community.
- (5) Academic Outreach Programs: Such programs serve to improve the Agency's image within the university community, but are, at best, an indirect solution to Agency problems.

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